Infrastructure systems are becoming increasingly complex and interdependent. As a result our ability to predict the likelihood of large-scale failure of these systems has significantly diminished and the consequence of this is that we now have a greatly increased risk of devastating impacts to society.
Resilience and Reliability of Infrastructures representation of real world networks. However, this network class formed the basis for the small-world network class, developed by Watts and Strogatz 2 , which has been shown to replicate a range of real world networks including subway systems 3 . These two classes of network are characterised by a Poisson degree distribution; however, Barabasi and Albert discovered that real world networks tend to form a power law degree distribution 4 . Networks that follow this power law are more commonly known as scale-free networks and include the Internet and the WorldWide-Web. 5 Other real world networks, including power grids, have been found to have an exponential degree distribution and are termed 'exponential networks'. 6, 7, 8 The main advantage of classifying a real world network into a network class is that it gives an insight into the inherent hazard tolerance of a network. For example, infrastructure systems have been shown to fall into either the scale-free or exponential network class 9,10 and these networks consist of a small number of highly connected nodes and a large number of weakly connected nodes. As such they have been shown to be vulnerable to targeted attack, as this will tend to remove one of the highly connected nodes to cause the maximum disruption, and also resilient to random hazard, as this will tend to remove one of the many weakly connected components 11 .
In this paper, we are considering the hazard tolerance of two real world networks and whether we can use this approach to gain an insight into their resilience to different attack strategies. We have constructed a network model of both networks using data obtained from a real electricity distribution network and a real water network that is, in reality, connected to the electricity network. The electricity network consists of 883 nodes (representing the Grid Supply Points, Bulk Supply Points, Primary Substations and Distribution Substations) and 3039 connecting links; whilst the water network consists of 144 nodes (representing the Source Nodes, Pumping Stations, Water Treatment Works, Service Reservoirs and Demand Nodes) and 305 connecting links. For a detailed explanation of the process used to model real world networks using network graph theory, the reader is directed to Dunn et al.
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The degree distributions for these two networks have been shown in Figure 1 . From this figure, it can be seen that the water network clearly follows an exponential distribution (forming a straight line when the results are plotted on a log-linear axis). However, it is more difficult to classify the electricity network, as it does not appear to fit exactly into one network class. This is due to the presence of a large number of small degree nodes. As the water network can be classed as exponential, it should be resilient to random hazard and vulnerable to targeted attack. However, classifying these networks does not necessarily give an insight into the hazard tolerance of the water network when the electricity network is disrupted, as the dependent links between these networks are not considered. To establish this relationship, an additional analysis approach is needed. Previous studies have modelled the interdependency between two coupled networks by using additional links, which are usually directed, to represent the dependence of components in one network upon those in another. One study by Buldyrev et al. 13 assessed impact of failure within Internet infrastructure as a result of disruption to electricity infrastructure. In their study, they identified the dependent links between the two networks by coupling each Internet server to the geographically nearest power station. They then removed power stations, at random, and observed the resulting impact to the Internet network, following an iterative process to fail connected nodes. Nodes were deemed to have failed if (1) all of their connected nodes were failed and/or (2) their dependent node in the other network was failed. They showed that these networks were extremely sensitive to random failures and that the removal of a small fraction of nodes in one network was sufficient to produce an iterative cascade of failures in the interdependent network.
Further studies have attempted to identify a critical threshold (or proportion of failed nodes) which induces this cascade of failures in the dependent network, by combining network theory with percolation theory. One notable study by Gao et al. 14 , developed this approach and used it to study the failures between two partially interdependent random networks. In their study, they 'fail' a proportion of nodes in one network and observe how the failure propagates to the connected network, by defining two conditions for failure: (1) nodes fail if they do not belong to the largest cluster of nodes, and (2) nodes also fail if they depend on the failed nodes in the other network.
However, this percolation theory approach only considers the topology of the network and does not consider the direction of flow in these networks or their hierarchical structure. For example, in electricity infrastructure a Primary Substation can only operate if it is connected to, at least one, Bulk Supply Point and this is not captured in a purely topological model. Therefore, we develop a new approach which recognises that nodes are used to represent a range of components and that flow between these components is not always bi-directional.
DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCY MODEL
We develop what we term a 'functional dependency' model which incorporates the hierarchical structure of real world infrastructure networks and the direction of flow through the use of directed links. Following traditional network theory models, we use nodes to represent the different components in both networks, however, unlike traditional models we record the type of component that the node represents. Figure 2 shows the type, and number, of each component in both the electricity (red) and water (blue) networks.
By recording the different types of nodes we can ensure that the hierarchical structure, observed in real world networks, is maintained (e.g. electricity can flow from a Grid Supply Point to a Bulk Supply Point, but not vice versa). We could simulate the flow of service in these networks using a flow model, such as that presented by Dunn and Wilkinson 15 ; however, we deem a detailed study of flow and capacity outside the scope of this paper and therefore use the hierarchical structure to make an assumption regarding the capacity of each of the 'supply' components (e.g. Grid Supply Points and Service Reservoirs). The intention is not to replicate the extant network precisely, but rather to develop a plausible model that captures the essential failure characteristics of the real network.
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Grid In the electricity network we achieve this by using Dijkstra's algorithm to calculate the length, in terms of the number of nodes traversed, of the shortest route from each Distribution Substation to each Primary Substation. It is assumed that the closest Primary Substation supplies the Distribution Substation under normal operational conditions. Based on discussions with local experts, we also define the limit to the area a primary substation might supply in an emergency as 50% greater than its supply boundary in its typical configuration.
In the water network, the dependencies of the different components in the raw water sections of the network are easily understood, they take the shape of dendritic patterns feeding into the three water treatment works which then feed directly into service reservoirs. The downstream network requires more interpretation. In addition to the connectivity of the network, the ability of a service reservoir to feed a demand node is based upon their respective elevations. If the reservoir level was more than 20 metres above the highest property in the demand node then it can be supplied (the 20 meter difference accounts for the need to deliver a minimum level of pressure to a consumer's property). It is assumed that pumping stations can provide a pressure equivalent to the level of the highest point they supply.
The identification of dependent links between the networks is simplified because, as major consumers, the water components generally have named substations. The proximal substation was used for the two components where this was not the case. Between these networks we identified 31 dependent links and the components they connect have been shown in Figure 2 (black arrows).
In a similar manner to previous studies, we randomly fail a proportion of nodes in the electricity network and observe how this failure propagates to the dependent water network, by defining two conditions of failure. Nodes in the water network are deemed to have failed if they are (1) no longer connected to at least one functional 'parent' node (e.g. a node that is directly above them in the hierarchical structure), or (2) are connected to a dependent node in the other network which has been failed. However, unlike previous studies, we observe how the failure of components at different levels in the electricity network impacts the water network. We initially fail a proportion of nodes of different components (termed primary failure) and observe how this failure cascades throughout the network (removing further nodes, termed secondary failure), before considering how this failure propagates to the water network. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3 . From Figure 3 , it can be seen that the removal of different components in the electricity network have different impacts upon the water network. This is expected; removing a distribution substation is unlikely to affect other nodes but the effect of a lost bulk supply point will cascade through the system. However, it is interesting to note the different patterns of impacts caused by the failures at different levels in the hierarchy. For example, it can be seen that the correlation between primary substations failures and failed demand components is non-linear, and appears to increase exponentially (Figure 3(c) ). By contrast the correlation between the number of failed distribution substations and the number of demand components (Figure 3(d) ) is linear, although there is a large amount of scatter in the results.
It is also evident that the complete failure of the electricity network (shown on the extreme right of the graphs in Figure  3 ) does not result in the complete failure of the water network. This is due to the presence of the service reservoirs (which do not require a supply of electricity to function) meaning that approximately 80% of the demand components network remain functional. It should be noted that we only perform a static analysis, and therefore do not capture the depletion of these resources; however, these components typically have sufficient capacity to last longer than the power companies' expected return to service time.
